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1938] NOTES
THE EFFECT OF FLUCTUATING RATES OF INTEREST
ON THE NEGOTIABILITY OF AN INSTRUMENT
It is a well-settled rule of statute that a negotiable instrument
must be for a sum certain.' The effect of discounts and changing
interest rates on the "sum certain" requirement has, however,3
bothered the courts for some time. By the terms of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law itself, this question must be solved by
the rules of the Law Merchant.4 An attempt will be made to
classify certain instruments which provide for changing rates
of interest, and to discover, if possible, a standard which can
be used to determine whether or not such instruments satisfy the
requirement that a negotiable instrument be for a sum certain.
I
The simplest class of instruments involving a changing inter-
est rate may be divided into two types. The instruments com-
prising the first type bear one rate of interest on the principal
until the maturity of the note, and a higher rate on the principal
from maturity of the note until the obligation is discharged.
Instruments of the second type are free of interest until the
maturity of the principal, but bear interest on the principal after
maturity until the note is paid. An example of the first type
of instrument is found in Citizens' Savings Bank¢ v. Landis.5
1. N. I. L. see. 1 (2), R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2630 (2): "An instrument
to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements: * * * (2)
Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money." N. I. L. sec. 2, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2631: "The sum payable is
a sum certain within the meaning of this act, altho it is to be paid: 1)
with interest; or 2) by stated instalments; or 3) by stated instalments,
with a provision that upon default in payment of any instalment or of
interest the whole shall become due; or 4) with exchange, whether at a
fixed rate or at the current rate; or 5) with costs of collection or an
attorney's fee, in case payment shall not be made at maturity." N. I. L.
see. 184, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2812: "A negotiable promissory note within
the meaning of this act is an unconditional promise in writing made by one
person to another signed by the maker engaging to pay on demand, or at
a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to order or to
bearer. Where a note is drawn to the maker's own order, it is not com-
plete until indorsed by him."
2. Omitted.
3. First Nat. Bank of Iowa City, Iowa v. Watson (1916) 56 Old. 495,
511, 149 Atl. 21, 23, where the court said that section 2 of the N. I. L.
would have expressly so provided if it had been intended that a discount
provision giving the maker an option to discharge the instrument within
30 days of its date should not affect the certainty.
4. N. I. L. sec. 196; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2827: "In any case not pro-
vided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
5. Citizens' Savings Bank of Columbus, Ohio v. Landis (1913) 37 Old.
530, 132 Pac. 1101.
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The instrument was dated March 6, 1906, and the promise was
to pay $1200 with interest at 6% per annum before maturity,
and 10% per annum after maturity, until paid. Interest was
payable annually. Most courts have held that such a provision
does not render the amount uncertain, nor render the instrument
non-negotiable, 6 although the provision for a higher rate of inter-
est after maturity has been held to violate the usury laws and
therefore to work a forfeiture of the entire interest.7 An instru-
ment dated June 4, 1890, and due 90 days after date, with inter-
est at 8% per annum payable only after maturity is character-
istic of the above-mentioned second type.8 The instruments of
this type do not differ materially from those of the former type,
and it would seem, on principle, that they should be negotiable.
A majority of the courts have so held.9
II
In another group of instruments the rate change is brought
about by failure to pay the principal at maturity, but the in-
creased rate applies not from maturity until paid, but from the
6. Hutson v. Rankin (1922) 36 Idaho 169, 213 Pac. 345; Towne v. Rice
(1876) 122 Mass. 67; Goedhard v. Folstad (1923) 156 Minn. 454, 195 N. W.
281; Kendall v. Selby (1902) 66 Neb. 60, 92 N. W. 178; Hollinshead v.
John Stuart & Co. (1898) 8 N. D. 35, 77 N. W. 89; Citizens' Savings Bank
of Columbus, Ohio v. Landis (1913) 37 Old. 530, 132 Pac. 1101; Merrill v.
Hurley (1895) 6 S. D. 592, 62 N. W. 958; contra Second National Bank of
Richmond v. Wheeler (1889) 75 Mich. 546, 43 N. W. 963; Cornish v. Wool-
verton (1905) 32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4; Bracken v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1914)
42 Old. 118, 141 Pac. 6, L. R. A. 1915B 1216. Other cases supporting the
majority view but involving other provisions in addition to the typical ones
are: Allen v. Cooling (1924) 161 Minn. 10, 200 N. W. 849; Lister v. Donlan
(1929) 85 Mont. 571, 281 Pac. 853; Moore v. Interstate Mortgage Trust
Co. (1935) 172 Old. 471, 45 P. (2d) 485; Sharpe v. Schoenberger (1921) 44
S. D. 402, 184 N. W. 209; Continental & Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago
v. Jefferson (1927) 51 S. D. 477, 215 N. W. 533; De Hass v. Roberts
(C. C. W. D. Pa. 1894) 59 Fed. 853, rev'd (C. C. A. 3, 1895) 70 Fed. 227.
7. Allen v. Cooling (1924) 161 Minn. 10, 200 N. W. 849; Goedhard v.
Folstad (1923) 156 Minn. 454, 195 N. W. 281. This result was reached
under Minn. G. S. (1913) sec. 5805; Minn., Mason's Stats. (1927) see.
7036, which provides that contracts must bear the same rate of interest
after they become due as before. The question whether provisions such as
those under discussion provide for penalties is beyond the scope of this
article.
8. Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1892) 52 Fed.
191, 17 L. R. A. 595.
9. Dorsey v. Wolff (1892) 142 Ill. 589, 32 N. E. 495; Houghton v.
Francis (1862) 29 Ill. 244; Kuhn v. National City Bank (1918) 187 Ind.
726, 119 N. E. 145; Millikan v. Security Trust Co. (1918) 187 Ind. 307,
118 N. E. 568; Bunting v. Mick (1892) 55 Ind. App. 289, 31 N. E. 378;
Hatch v. Bank of Dexter (1900) 94 Me. 348, 47 Atl. 908; Farmers' Nat.
Bank of Valparaiso, Indiana v. Sutton Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1892) 52
Fed. 191, 17 L. R. A. 595; contra Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. McCoy
& Spivey Bros. (1912) 32 Old. 277, 122 Pac. 125, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177;
Dickerson v. Higgins (1905) 15 Old. 588, 82 Pac. 649.
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date of the instrument until paid. These instruments may also
be divided into two types: first, those which bear interest at one
rate until maturity, but if not paid at maturity bear a different
and higher rate from the date of the instrument; second, those
which bear no interest until maturity, but if not paid at maturity
bear interest from date. The first type is illustrated by a note
with the following clauses: "with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date, if not paid when due 8% from date."' 0 A
different way of phrasing this type of instrument, with the same
legal effect is by a stipulation that the principal be payable with
interest at the rate of 9% per annum, payable annually, from
date until paid; but if the note be not paid on or before maturity,
interest should only be 7%.11 The court, in the latter instance,
held that the provision with respect to interest was equivalent
to one saying that interest on the principal was payable from
date until maturity at 7% per annum, but if the note was not
paid when due, it should bear interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from date.12 The majority holding is that this type of
instrument, expressed in either form, meets the requirement of
certainty of sum.13
An example of an instrument representing the second type
considered in this section was one dated May 1, 1905, in which
the maturity date was November 1, 1905.14 The maker promised
to pay $500 with interest at 8%, payable annually from the
maturity date until discharged. Interest, however, was to be paid
from date, if the note was not paid when due. The instruments
falling into this division are practically indistinguishable from
those in the first division, and a majority of courts have logically
held that such provisions do not destroy negotiability.1 5
10. Farm Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Martin (1927) 51 S. D. 424, 214
N. W. 816.
11. Union Nat. Bank of Massillon, Ohio v. Mayfield (1918) 71 Old. 22,
174 Pac. 1034, 2 A. L. R. 135.
12. See Smith v. Crane (1885) 33 Minn. 144, 22 N. W. 633, 53 Am. Rep.
20.
13. Clark v. Skeen (1900) 61 Kan. 526, 60 Pac. 327, 78 Am. St. Rep.
337; Crump v. Berdan (1893) 97 Mich. 293, 56 N. W. 559, 37 Am. St. Rep.
345; First Nat. Bank of Port Huron v. Carson (1886) 60 Mich. 432, 27
N. W. 589; Smith v. Crane (1885) 33 Minn. 144, 22 N. W. 633, 53 Am.
Rep. 20; Union Nat. Bank v. Mayfield (1918) 71 Old. 22, 174 Pac. 1034,
2 A. L. R. 135; Farm Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Martin (1927) 51 S. D.
424, 214 N. W. 816; contra Cayuga County Nat. Bank of Auburn v. Purdy(1885) 56 Mich. 6, 22 N. W. 93 (instrument held non-negotiable, but inter-
est clause not specifically attacked); Hegeler v. Comstock (1890) 1 S. D.
138, 45 N. W. 331, 8 L. R. A. 393 (overruled by Farm Mortgage & Loan
Co. v. Martin (1927) 51 S. D. 424, 214 N. W. 816).
14. Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Gleichman (1915) 50 Old. 44, 150
Pac. 908, L. R. A. 1915F. 1203.
15. Reeves v. Stipp (1879) 91 Ill. 609; Parker v. Plymell (1880) 23 Kan.
402; Citizens' Bank v. Booze (1898) 75 Mo. App. 189; Hope v. Barker
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III
The litigated discount provisions may be divided into two gen-
eral classes: (1) discount provisions which are to take effect
before maturity, and (2) "discount" provisions which are to
take effect either "at maturity" or "on or before maturity." An
example of the first class is found in Waterhouse v. Chouinard,6
which involved a promissory note payable in installments, (the
first installment becoming due 6 months after date, and the sec-
ond and last installment 12 months after date) with interest at
6% per annum on overdue payments. The maker had the privi-
lege of discharging the indebtedness by payment of the principal
less a discount of 5% within 30 days of the date of the note.
The court decided that this discount provision rendered the sum
uncertain, and held the note non-negotiable. There has been a
conflict of authority as to the effect of such a discount provision
on the certainty of the note.'1
The second class of instrument involving a discount has previ-
ously been noted. 18 Illustrative of this type is an instrument in
which the principal bore interest at the rate of 9% per annum,
payable annually, from date until paid. It contained a provision
that if the note were paid on or before maturity, the interest
(1892) 112 Mo. 338, 20 S. W. 567, 34 Am. St. Rep. 387; Christian County
Bank v. Goode (1891) 44 Mo. App. 129; Jackson v. Fennimore (1924) 104
Old. 134, 230 Pac. 689; Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Gleichman (1915)
50 Old. 441, 150 Pac. 908, L. R. A. 1915F 1203; Commercial Credit Co. v.
Nissen (1926) 49 S. D. 303, 207 N. W. 61, 213 N. W. 943; contra Randolph
v. Hudson (1903) 12 Old. 516, 74 Pac. 946, which was overruled by Security
Trust & Savings Bank v. Gleichman (1915) 50 Old. 441, 150 Pac. 908,
L. R. A. 1915F 1203.
16. Waterhouse v. Chouinard (1930) 128 Me. 505, 149 Atl. 21.
17. The following cases have held that such a provision renders the sum
uncertain: Waterhouse v. Chouinard (1930) 128 Me. 505, 149 AtI. 21; Way
v. Smith (1873) 111 Mass. 523; Lamb v. Storey (1881) 45 Mich. 488, 8
N. W. 87 (1884) 52 Mich. 525, 18 N. W. 248; Fralick v. Norton (1851)
2 Mich. 130, 55 Am. Dec. 56. (agreement that payment of $50 on a $60
note, 10 days before maturity would cancel the note); Lambert v. Harrison
(1918) 69 Old. 172, 171 Pac. 45; First Nat. Bank of Iowa City v. Watson
(1916) 56 Old. 495, 155 Pac. 1152; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. McCoy
& Spivey Bros. (1912) 31 Old. 433, 122 Pac. 125, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.)
177; Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Feeney (1899) 12 S. D. 156, 80 N. W. 186,
46 L. R. A. 732, 76 Am. St. Rep. 594; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Devear
(1911) 2 Tenn. C. C. A. 366; contra First Nat. Bank of Iowa City v.
Rooney (1913) 11 Dom. L. R. 358; Seymour & Co. v. Artz (1926) 5 La.
App. 556; Russell v. Klink (1884) 53 Mich. 161, 18 N. W. 627 (discount
provision of 7%, allowed from the time of payment until maturity, appeared
on the back of the note) ; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Planck (1915)
98 Neb. 225, 152 N. W. 390, L. R. A. 1915E 564; Stevens v. Baldy (1917)
67 Pa. Sup'r Ct. 145, where lower court held the instrument negotiable
but superior court reversed the decision on another ground; Harrison v.
Hunter (Texas 1914) 168 S. W. 1036.
18. See section II of this article.
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should only be 7%.19 The majority rule seems to be that such a
provision does not destroy the certainty of sum required by the
Law Merchant and the Negotiable Instruments Law .2
IV
The courts have used different tests to determine whether the
above types of varying-interest rate provisions satisfy the re-
quirement as to "sum certain."
A. A provision which required payment of 6% interest from
the date of the instrument if not paid at maturity was said to
make the amount uncertain and contingent, thereby rendering
the paper non-negotiable.21 The court, however, held that this
provision did not make the amount uncertain, saying that "'the
spirit of the rule requiring precision in the amount of negotiable
instruments applies rather to principal amount than to ancillary
and incidental additions of interest or exchange.' ,,2 The above
language, however, dealt with the effect of exchange provisions
on the certainty of the amount. Altho it would be strong persua-
sive authority, it does not furnish direct support for the decision.
This test, if applied literally, would dispense with an examination
of the interest provisions, and would favor the negotiability of
instruments such as those under consideration.
B. A Kansas court enunciated a test that has many adherents.2 3
The maker promised to pay interest at the rate of 12% after
maturity, but there was another provision to the effect that if
the note was not paid at maturity, it should bear the 12% inter-
est rate from date. The court held the instrument negotiable
stating that these provisions as to interest came into effect only
19. Union Nat. Bank v. Mayfield (1918) 71 Old. 22, 174 Pac. 1034, 2
A. L. R. 135.
20. Loring v. Anderson (1905) 95 Minn. 101, 103 N. W. 722; Union Nat.
Bank of Massillon, Ohio v. Mayfield (1918) 71 Old. 22, 174 Pac. 1034, 2
A. L. R. 135; see Capital City Bank v. Swift (D. C. E. D. Old. 1923) 290
Fed. 505 (a trade acceptance with provision "if paid when due a discount
of $156.73 may be deducted reducing the face of this acceptance to
$3,142.92") ; Smith v. Crane (1885) 33 Minn. 144, 22 N. W. 633, 53 Am.
Rep. 20 ("with interest at 10% per annum from date until paid; 7% if
paid when due"); Mansfield Savings Bank v. Miller (1887) 2 Ohio C. C.
96, 1 Ohio C. D. 383, 53 0. S. 666 ("if this note is paid in full when due,
a discount of $39.78 is to be made from the amount then due"); Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Nissen (1926) 49 S. D. 303, 207 N. W. 61 (1927)
51 S. D. 357, 213 N. W. 943; contra Edwards v. Ramsey (1882) 30 Minn.
91, 14 N. W. 272; Third Nat. Bank of Syracuse v. Armstrong (1870) 25
Minn. 530; see also Hegeler v. Comstock (1890) 1 S. D. 138, 45 N. W.
331, 8 L. R. A. 393 ("8% if paid when due").
21. Christian County Bank v. Goode (1891) 44 Mo. App. 129.
22. 1 Daniels, Negotiable Instruments (3rd ed. 1882) 58, sec. 54a. See
1 Daniels, Negotiable Instruments (7th ed. 1933) 70, sec. 60.
23. Parker v. Plymell (1880) 23 Kan. 402.
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after the notes were dishonored and had lost their negotiability,
and there was no uncertainty in the manner and extent of their
operation. Therefore they should not affect the negotiability of
the instrument. A federal court has said that this is not the best
test of certainty, since it would not be applicable to provisions
for exchange.24 The Kansas test is also objectionable in its appli-
cation to a discount provision such as was involved in Water-
house v. Chouinard.25 It has, however, been used many times2g
by courts desiring to uphold the negotiability of an instrument
which would be non-negotiable under the next test to be dis-
cussed.
C. The test applied by a South Dakota court 7 has frequently
been responsible for holding an instrument non-negotiable when
it contained a provision involving a fluctuating rate of interest.
That court said that it is not sufficient that the amount necessary
to liquidate the note on the day it is due is certain and can be
determined, but that the certainty must continue until the obliga-
tion is discharged.
There should be such a degree of certainty that the exact
amount to become due and payable at any future date should
be clearly ascertainable at the date of the note, uninfluenced
by any condition not certain of fulfillment.2'
Courts have applied this test to all the types of cases so far con-
sidered with the result that they have frequently found that
particular interest provisions did not meet the requirements of
certainty.29 This would seem to be too stringent a test, and one
24. Cudahy Packing Co. v. State Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8, 1904) 134 Fed.
538. This case involved the effect of a stipulation for attorney's fees on the
certainty of the sum. It was decided before the enactment of the N. I. L.
25. See section III of this note.
26. Mansfield Savings Bank v. Miller et al. (1887) 2 Ohio C. C. 95, 1
Ohio C. D. 383, 53 0. S. 666; Capital City State Bank v. Swift (D. C.
E. D. Old. 1923) 290 Fed. 505; see concurring opinion in Hegeler v. Corn-
stock (1890) 1 S. D. 138, 45 N. W. 331, 8 L. R. A. 393. See also Bigelow,
Negotiable Instruments (Lile) (3rd ed. 1928) 71, sec. 114, where it is stated
that "the consideration that such stipulations do not affect the time of
maturity, and 'are not operative during the currency of the instrument,
but become effective only after dishonor, when the instrument has ceased
to be negotiable in the full sense, has influenced the majority of courts,
following the better principle, to interpret such stipulations as not violative
of the rule of certainty of sum, nor otherwise affecting negotiability."
27. Hegeler v. Comstock (1890) 1 S. D. 138, 45 N. W. 331, 8 L. R. A.
393.
28. Waterhouse v. Chouinard (1930) 128 Me. 505, 511, 149 Atl. 21, 23.
29. Waterhouse v. Chouinard (1930) 128 Me. 505, 149 At. 21; Lamb v.
Story (1881) 45 Mich. 488, 8 N. W. 87 (1884) 52 Mich. 525, 18 N. W.
248; Lambert v. Harrison (1918) 69 Old. 172, 171 Pac. 45; First Nat.
Bank v. Watson (1916) 56 Old. 495, 155 Pac. 1152; Bracken v. Fidelity
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that would not be applied by the very people who most frequently
use negotiable instruments. It has been disapproved by the very
judges bound to follow it by stare decisisY° On the other hand
it was adopted as a preferable view, after a thorough resume of
the discount cases in Waterhouse v. Chouinard-3
D. A test more nearly in accord with the policy of holding in-
struments negotiable if possible 2 and more closely coinciding
with the commercial notion of certainty was applied where the
instrument provided for payment of principal with interest at
7%, and contained a further stipulation that if the principal was
not paid when due, the maker would pay 10% interest from the
date of the instrument until paid.3 3 The court said that there
was no date at which the precise amount due on the note could
not have been determined by an inspection of the instrument it-
self. Courts applying this test merely require that at any given
date, the amount due on the instrument can be ascertained, un-
aided by any information not appearing on the instrument.34 In
Cudahy Packing Co. v. State National Bank, 5 which dealt with
the formerly very troublesome question of the effect of a stipula-
tion for attorney's fees on the certainty of the instrument, it
was said
The rule requiring certainty in commercial paper was a rule
of commerce before it was a rule of law. It requires com-
mercial, not mathematical certainty. An uncertainty which
does not impair the functions of negotiable instruments in
Trust Co. (1914) 42 Old. 118, 141 Pac. 6, L. R. A. 1915B 1216; Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. McCoy & Spivey Bros. (1922) 31 Old. 433, 122 Pac.
125, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177; Randolph v. Hudson (1903) 12 Old. 516, 74
Pac. 946; National Bank of Commerce v. Feeney (1899) 12 S. D. 156, 80
N. W. 186, 46 L. R. A. 732, 76 Am. St. Rep. 594; Merrill v. Hurley (1895)
6 S. D. 592, 62 N. W. 958.
30. Merrill v. Hurley (1895) 6 S. D. 592, 62 N. W. 958.
31. Waterhouse v. Chouinard (1930) 128 Me. 505, 149 Atl. 21.
32. International Finance Corp. v. Philadelphia Wholesale Drug Co.(1933) 312 Pa. 280, 167 Atl. 790; Williamson et al. v. Craig et al. (1927)
204 Iowa 555, 215 N. W. 664.
33. Crump v. Berdan (1893) 97 Mich. 293, 56 N. W. 559, 37 Am. St.
Rep. 345.
34. First Nat. Bank of Iowa City v. Rooney (1913) 11 Dom. L. R. 358;
Hatch v. First National Bank of Dexter (1900) 94 Me. 348, 47 Atl. 908,
80 Am. St. Rep. 401; Crump v. Berdan (1893) 97 Mich. 293, 56 N. W. 559,
37 Am. St. Rep. 345; Loring v. Anderson (1905) 95 Minn. 101, 103 N. W.
722; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. of Iowa City, Iowa v. Planck (1915) 98
Neb. 225, 152 N. W. 390, L. R. A. 1915 E 564. See Commercial Credit Co.
v. Nissen (1926) 49 S. D. 303, 207 N. W. 61, 51 S. D. 357, 213 N. W.
943; Merrill v. Hurley (1895) 6 S. D. 592, 62 N. W. 958 (see personal
opinion of judge, but not the holding).
35. Cudahy Packing Co. v. State Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8, 1904) 134 Fed.
538, 67 C. C. A. 662.
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the judgment of business men ought not to be regarded by
the courts.28
The case further commented on the fact that whenever an instru-
ment was presented, varying in some of its features from the
ordinary promissory note or bill of exchange, the English courts
would call in business men for their guidance. If, from their
evidence, it appeared that the instrument in question was by the
general custom and practice of the business world treated as a
negotiable instrument, the courts would give effect to that usage
and hold the instrument negotiable37 The rule of commercial
certainty suggested by the aforementioned case and universal
adoption of the English practice would obviate much of the con-
flict that has arisen over fluctuating interest rates. This rule
has been successfully applied to an interest provision more com-
plicated than any yet considered.38
V
The instruments considered, thus far, have involved changing
interest rates on the principal,39 but there are also instruments
which involve "secondary" interest on "primary," 0 in addition
to the features considered in the first two sections. The simplest
type of instrument to be considered in this section is illustrated
by a promissory note, due in one year, bearing 6% interest per
annum, payable annually, with principal and interest not paid
when due bearing interest at 10% per annum until paid.41 The
Montana Supreme Court held that such a provision did not
render the amount uncertain. The effect of the provision for
increase of interest on the principal, if not paid when due, has
already been considered,42 and the only new problem is whether
or not the stipulation for "secondary" 40 interest on interest
renders the sum uncertain. In the first place, it seems well settled
that a mere provision for compound interest does not render the
sum uncertain.43 It has previously been shown that a provision
36. Cudahy Packing Co. v. State Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8, 1904) 134 Fed.
538, 542.
,37. Id. at 543.
38. Continental & Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson (1927)
51 S. D. 477, 215 N. W. 533.
39. See sections I, II, and III of this note.
40. For the purpose of convenience, interest on the principal will be
referred to as "primary" interest, and the higher rate of interest on the
primary interest will be called "secondary" interest. This note does not
discuss the common type of compound interest, where the secondary and
primary interest are at the same rate.
41. Lister v. Donlan (1929) 85 Mont. 571, 281 Pac. 348.
42. See sections I and II of this article.
43. Fox v. Crane (1919) 43 Cal. App. 559, 185 Pac. 415; Glenn v. Rice
(1917) 174 Cal. 269, 162 Pac. 1020; Gilmore v. Hurst (1896) 56 Kan. 626,
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for increase of interest on the principal at maturity of the prin-
cipal has generally been held not to render the amount uncertain.
If that is true, it seems that the same result should follow in the
present case. In the above instrument, it will be noticed that no
interest payment is due until the maturity of the principal, i. e.,
there can be no "secondary" interest before the maturity of the
principal. 44 Applying the tests discussed in the previous section,
it is evident that the same result would be reached whenever
test "A," "B," or "D" is used."5
Another variation of the "interest on interest" problem is
illustrated by Continental & Commercial National Bank of Chi-
cago v. Jefferson,46 in which it was held possible to have "sec-
ondary" interest before maturity of the principal. There the
instrument matured in one year from its date, and the maker
promised to pay the principal with interest at the rate of 8%
per annum, payable semi-annually, from date until due. There
was another provision to the effect that if any of the principal
or interest was not paid when due, it (principal or interest)
should bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum, payable semi-
annually, until paid. It was argued that the instrument did not
call for a sum certain, since it was impossible to tell in advance
whether the maker would pay the semi-annual interest payment
when it came due at the end of the first 6 months' period, and
if it was not paid, then the amount necessary to retire the note
at its maturity would be quite different from the amount neces-
sary to retire the note if the semi-annual interest installment had
been paid. It was held, however, that the provision did not render
the instrument uncertain in amount. The court applied the test
of "commercial certainty,"'47 and said that in a note of this kind,
if the maker complies with his contract, there is no question
about the amount necessary to pay the note at maturity, and
if he does not so comply, the matter is one of simple computation.
44 Pac. 603; Brown v. Vossen (1905) 112 Mo. App. 676, 87 S. W. 577;
Barker v. Sartori (1911) 66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac. 611. In the latter case
there was interest on interest, but the court did not specifically deal with
that point.
44. See also Cherry v. Sprague (1904) 187 Mass. 113, 72 N. E. 456, 67
L. R. A. 33, 105 Am. St. Rep. 381; contra Dickerson v. Higgins (1905)
15 Okl. 588, 82 Pac. 649. This instrument involved a stipulation for attor-
ney's fees in addition to the interest provision. It is difficult to tell which
factor was responsible for the decision.
45. Under test "C" the instrument would probably have been held non-
negotiable.
46. Continental & Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson (1927)
51 S. D. 477, 215 N. W. 533.
47. See section IV, test "D" of this note.
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The court overruled dictum in Sharpe v. Schoenberger,48 which
had involved a promissory note dated April 8, 1920, due Oct. 9,
1920, and payable with interest at the rate of 8% per annum,
payable semi-annually, until fully paid, but with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum on overdue interest. There was dictum
in that case to the effect that if the note had been made payable
one or two years after date, this provision would have made the
instrument non-negotiable by reason of the uncertainty of the
promise. There would then be a possibility of "secondary" inter-
est before the maturity of the principal. But in the Schoen-
berger case there was no possibility of this because the instru-
ment was only a six months' note.
In a recent case 4' the note was dated July 29, 1930, and was
to bear 61/2 interest per annum until maturity, August 1, 1937,
payable semi-annually. After maturity the principal sum was
to bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The 61/2% inter-
est was payable by means of coupons in the form of promissory
notes, which after their maturity bore interest at the rate of
10% per annum. If one considers the principal note and the
interest notes together, the entire obligation could be classified
as one in which there would be a possibility of "secondary" inter-
est before the maturity of the principal, and in that aspect like
the obligation in the Continental Bank case. 0 The court, how-
ever, regarded it merely as a case of an increased rate of interest
on the principal at the maturity of the principal and held it
negotiable without considering the "interest on interest" prob-
lem. This method of using separate instruments for the principal
and the interest would seem to be a possible way to avoiding the
argument in the Continental case,5 ' and still secure the same
advantages for the holder.
The Montana case of Cornish v. Woolverton 5 2 involved a note
due five years from date with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date until maturity, payable semi-annually, accord-
ing to the tenor of interest notes. The note and the interest
coupons were to draw interest at the rate of 12% per annum
after their maturity. The court held the instrument uncertain
in sum, because it was not certain that the condition referred
48. See Sharpe v. Schoenberger (1921) 44 S. D. 402, 404, 184 N. W.
209, 209.
49. Moore v. Interstate Mortgage Trust Co. et al. (1935) 172 Old. 471,
45 P. (2d) 485.
50. Supra, note 46.
51. Supra, note 46.
52. Cornish v. Woolverton (1905) 32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4, 108 Am. St.
Rep. 598.
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to would be fulfilled, and because the instrument contained a
contract other than that authorized by statute.5 An opposite
result was reached where there was 54 an instrument having simi-
lar interest clauses, plus an additional provision that the notes
were secured by a mortgage which provided that if any of the
interest coupons were not paid at maturity, the principal debt
would become due, and the unpaid coupon, first matured, would
become part of the principal, and the whole principal debt and
the first unpaid coupon would bear interest at 12% per annum
from maturity of said coupon until paid. In each of these cases
it was possible to have "secondary" interest before the maturity
of the principal, and if the courts had used the rule of "com-
mercial certainty," the instruments would have been held nego-
tiable in each case. The court in the latter situation 55 reached its
result with little reasoning, relying on a case 58 which expressed
the theory that provisions which come into effect only after
maturity do not affect negotiability.57 The Montana court later 5
said that the Woolverton case59 was largely based on a South
Dakota case,60 and upon a statute6, similar to that involved in
the latter case in which the court had demanded the standard
of certainty required by test "4C.''62
An instrument that has caused quite a bit of conflict is found
in First National Bank of Miami v. Bosler.63 The instrument
was dated March 16, 1925, payable on or before 18 months after
date, with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from date until
fully paid. Interest was payable semi-annually. Deferred pay-
ments were to bear interest from maturity at 10% per annum
payable semi-annually. The court held that this instrument did
not call for a sum certain because there were two irreconcilable
53. Montana Civil Code (1895) sec. 3991: "A negotiable instrument is a
written promise or request for the payment of a certain sum of money to
order or bearer, in conformity to the provisions of this article." Sec. 3993:
"A negotiable instrument must be made payable in money only, and with-
out any condition not certain of fulfillment." Sec. 3997: "A negotiable in-
strument must not contain any other contract than such as specified in this
article."
54. DeHass v. Roberts (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1894) 59 Fed. 853, aff'd (C. C.
A. 3, 1895) 70 Fed. 227, 30 L. R. A. 189.
55. Supra, note 54.
56. Parker v. Plymell (1880) 23 Kan. 402.
57. See section IV, test "B" of this article.
58. Lister v. Donlan (1929) 85 Mont. 571, 281 Pac. 348.
59. Supra, note 52.
60. Hegeler v. Comstock (1890) 1 S. D. 138, 45 N. W. 331, 8 L. R. A.
393.
61. Supra, note 53.
62. See section IV, test "C" of this note.
63. First Nat. Bank of Miami v. Bosler (1929) 297 Pa. 353, 147 Atl. 74.
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clauses in respect to interest payable after maturity.6 4 On the
other hand, a New York court in ruling on the same type of
instrument held that there was no lack of certainty and that the
instrument was negotiable. 5 The court criticized the holding of
the Bosler case.
It was reasoned in that case [Bosler case] that the notes
carried 8% interest on the principal sum secured up to the
time when the principal or any part thereof was paid,
whether at or after maturity, that "deferred payments"
bearing 10% interest referred to payments of principal as
well as interest, and that thereby uncertainty of amount to
be paid resulted. We disagree with that reasoning.66
The New York court said that the 8% interest provision covers
all the principal unpaid and as long as it is unpaid, whether at
or after the maturity date of the notes. It was further stated
that "deferred payments" refers only to payments of interest
accrued and unpaid at and at anytime after the maturity date
of the note. The notes construed in this manner presented no
ambiguity or inconsistency to the court. While the result in this
case is probably desirable, there is no reason why the construc-
tion of "deferred payments" should be limited to "payments of
interest accrued and unpaid at and at any time after the maturity
date of the notes."67 It would seem that "deferred payments"
should refer to any overdue interest payment whether before or
after the maturity of the principal, and if such were the case,
the instrument would have "secondary" interest before the ma-
turity of the principal, which, according to the Continental case,68
is not objectionable.
In a recent United States Supreme Court case6- the instrument
bore interest on the principal sum at the rate of 7% per annum,
payable semi-annually, from date until fully paid. Deferred in-
terest payments were to bear interest from maturity at 10%,
payable semi-annually. The Supreme Court said that the instru-
ment was free of ambiguity and held it negotiable. The only
difference between the phrasing of this instrument and that of
the New York case is that this instrument said "deferred inter-
est payments," instead of merely "deferred payments." It was
64. See also New Miami Shores Corporation v. Duggan (1931) 9 N. J.
Misc. Rep. 620.
65. Lessen v. Lindsey (1933) 264 N. Y. S. 391.
66. Id. at 392.
67. Ibid. (Italics supplied).
68. Supra, note 46.
69. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried (1933) 292 U. S. 487, 64 S. Ct. 813,
78 L. ed. 1380.
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thought obvious that by "maturity" the draftsman meant ma-
turity of the interest, rather than maturity of the principal.
After adopting this construction, the court was faced with an
instrument resembling that in the Continental Bank case7 0 since
there was thus created a possibility of "secondary" interest be-
fore the maturity of the principal. If, as admitted, the court of
last resort of the state held that a provision for payment of inter-
est in installments prior to the maturity of the principal did not
create an uncertainty in the sum payable, an added stipulation
that overdue interest should bear interest at a named rate until
paid would not call for a different decision. The result reached
is perfectly in line with the "commercial certainty" test, but
would hardly have been reached with tests "B" and "C."27
VI
There are, of course, some instruments which through inad-
vertence or ignorance are so written that they cannot be held to
meet the requirement of "sum certain," even by application of
the most liberal rules. A case of this kind was presented where
the instrument was dated June 15, 1893, and was payable Novem-
ber 1, 1895, with interest from date until fully paid at the rate
of 10% per annum, payable annually on the principal and all
overdue unpaid interest.7 2 Another provision stipulated that if
the interest was not paid when due it should become part of the
principal and draw interest at 12% per annum until paid. The
court rightly held the instrument non-negotiable because it did
not call for a sum certain. There were two conflicting rates of
interest applying to overdue interest, and an inspection of the
instrument would not disclose whether overdue interest should
be paid at 10% per annum, or 12%. It was not clear whether
the principal plus the first overdue interest installment should be
carried at 12%.
Another example is found in a note which provided for pay-
ment of interest at 8% interest per annum until paid, and at
the same time provided for payment of 10% interest on any
deficiency resulting after the sale of collateral securities.73 Such
an instrument would not be negotiable even under the "commer-
cial certainty" test because there cannot be commercial certainty
in the face of hopelessly conflicting interest clauses.
70. Supra, note 46.
71. See section IV of this note.
72. Davis v. Brady (1903) 17 S. D. 511, 97 N. W. 719.
73. Asheraft v. Bream (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1932) 2 F. Supp. 344.
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CONCLUSION
None of the tests, which have been considered, may be applied
to every situation with a pristine clear result. There is no test
which is so infallible that it will automatically produce the proper
result if applied by a court unfamiliar with, or heedless of the
needs and common practices of the business world. The test of
"commercial certainty" is undoubtedly the standard that should
be applied to every case, but the test itself does not disclose just
what commercial certainty is. To define commercial certainty as
that degree of certainty which would be sufficient to satisfy a
business man of average business intelligence, is but to general-
ize. Such a definition, however, has one virtue: it should cause
the courts to look to the business world for guidance. If the
definition does that, it has accomplished its purpose. If the rule
that an instrument is sufficiently certain if at any given date an
inspection of the instrument will reveal data from which the
exact amount due on that date can be computed, and the policy
of the law in favor of the free circulation of commercial paper
are considered together, there will result practical tests which
may be employed to advantage as supplementing the rule of
"commercial certainty."
If a rationale of the apparent majority rules were desirable it
might be phrased as follows: The sum is sufficiently certain if
the only factor which will upset the certainty is a provision con-
taining either or both of the following features: (1) a promise
by the maker or primary party to pay either a fixed additional
sum, or interest at a definite additional rate, if he defaults on the
payment of the principal, an installment of the principal, or any
interest installment; or (2) an option of the maker to discharge
the obligation by payment in full either within a specified time
after the dite of the instrument, or at, on, or before the maturity
of the principal.
JACK J. FisHm.
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